Abstract-This paper proposed a new Stackelberg game theoretic solution for joint power control and channel allocation in Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs). The Primary Users (PUs) can admit Second Users (SUs) to access by pricing their interference power under the Interference Power Constraint (IPC). So, we formulate suitable revenue functions for SUs and PUs to manage the radio resource among users efficiently and fairly. Then, a novel algorithm is proposed to search the optimal price for PUs to maximize their revenues and prove the existence and uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium (NE). Moreover, a novel channel allocation algorithm is given to guarantee SUs' different QoS requirements and ensure fairness. Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm improves the performance compared with those proportionate game schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory is an effective tool for resource allocation in multi-user communication systems, which has been applied to Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs), and Ref. [1] summarized the advance of game theory for CRNs. Recently, Stackelberg game has been formulated for resource allocation involves the relationship of between PU and SUs in [2] - [8] .
Ref. [2] presented a joint pricing and power allocation scheme for CRNs with Stackelberg game, PUs and SUs can benefit from the channel sharing model by achieving the Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE). In [3] , a Stackelberg game is used to study the joint utility maximization of the PUs and the SUs with subject to a maximum tolerable IPC at the Primary Base Station (PBS). However, the algorithm is suboptimal because it does not consider how to control the IPC among PSB. Therefore, [4] proposed an optimal price-based power algorithm for the PBS and SUs maximize their revenue by Stackelberg game with IPC. [5] proposed an energy efficient resource allocation Manuscript received May 7, 2015 ; revised December 7, 2015 . This work was supported by the National Nature Science Foundation of China (61271259 and 61301123), the special fund of Chongqing key laboratory (CSTC), the Program for Changjiang Scholars and Innovative Research Team in University (IRT2129), the Graduate Student Research Innovation Project of Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications (Chongqing) (CYS14143).
Corresponding author email: yhelincqupt@163.com doi:10.12720/jcm.10.12.970-975 scheme in CRNs with femtocells as a Stackelberg game and used iteration algorithm to obtain the SE. To maximize users' energy efficiency of CRNs, a new green power control scheme was studied in [6] , [7] , where PUs and SUs aim at maximizing their energy efficiency with Stackelberg game. In [8] , the authors formulated Stackelberg game model to maximize the payoff of both SUs and PUs by jointly optimizing transmit powers of SUs and sub-band allocations of SUs. However, above papers almost aim to maximize users' revenue without considering the fairness among users and guaranteeing different SUs' minimum Signal-to-Interference plusNoise Ratio (SINR).
In this letter, we proposed a new Stackelberg game to model the strategy between the PUs and SUs in multichannel CRNs. PUs will search suitable prices to maximize their revenue from SUs while keeping their interference power under the IPC through the proof of the existence and uniqueness of NE. Moreover, a novel channel allocation algorithm is given to guarantee SUs' different QoS requirements and ensusre fairness among SUs.
The system model is shown in Fig. 1 . There are a PBS, a primary base station (SBS), K PUs and L SUs in the CRN. SUs should limit their transmit power to avoid extreme interference to the neighboring PUs. We will focus on the power control and channel allocation problem here. 
The SINR at the th i SU receiver on the channel n can be expressed by
where the interference is given by
In practical, the CRN tries to ensure no SU's , 
Note that this constraint is known as IPC in CRNs.
III. STACKELBERG GAME THEORETIC APPROACH
The PUs price the SUs to control the interference power made by the SUs under the IPC. Each PU will choose a suitable price to maximize its revenue from the SUs while keeping their interference power under the IPC. The SUs will choose an optimal power to maximize its revenue after the PUs set prices for them. Since each PU has higher priority than SUs, we use Stackelberg game to model the strategy between the PUs and SUs.
Then, the total revenue problem of the PBS is as follows
( , , ) ( Then, we set the revenue utility of the th i SU with three parts: the first one is the income from the SINR achieved from the PBS. The second part is the punishment. The last one is the payment to the th k PU. Then, the revenue utility function of the th i SU as follows:
where , si w is the preference factor of SU i for the unit SINR, i a is the coefficient, p is the transmit power of all SUs.
From (6), we consider the SINR requirement of SUs as tar ,,
to properly control the punishment function. From the second term in (6), we can see that the SUs who with higher SINR (better channel condition with meeting its minimum QoS requirement) should be set higher pricing punishment, which aims to control their behaviors and reduce interference to others. Therefore, the revenue problem for SU i is as follows 
where mx , a si p is the minimum transmit power of the th i SU. Then, taking the Problems 1 and Problems 2 together is a Stackelberg game.
In addition, a performance metric is needed to assess the fairness incurred in the resource competition system. Then, the Fairness Index (FI) factor is adopted here [9] , defined as
where, i R represents the rate allocated to the th i SU, 0 0 i R  that denotes its minimum date rate requirements.
IV. OPTIMAL PRICE ACHIEVEMENT
In this section, we will give an optimal price for PUs to maximize their revenues. At first, we give the relationship between SUs transmit power and the price, and express the revenue of each PU as the function of the transmit power of SUs. Then, we prove the revenue maximization problem of PUs is a concave function with the power of SUs. At last, we will prove the existence and uniqueness of the NE.
A. Optimal Price Solution
In order to obtain the relationship between each PU and SUs transmit power, we take the partial derivative of , , ,
We obtain the following equation based on (9) as follows
Substitute (10) into (5), the revenue of the th k PU can be rewritten as follows
The optimization variables for (11) are the transmit power vector of SUs. The revenue of the th k PU is expressed as a function of the transmit power showed in (11) .
The first order derivative of 
Then, we can express power ,
Next, we will prove that the objective function (11) exist the optimal solution through the proof of the existence and uniqueness of the NE point. 
B. Existence of Nash Equilibrium
From (14) U is a concave function of , n si p . Therefore, this guarantees the existence of NE.
C. Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium
Theorem 2 (Uniqueness): The NE of the joint power control and channel allocation game with pricing is unique.
Proof: From (13), when the interference of SUs can be detected, we can get 
n si pn  denotes the power of th i SU at the ( 1) th n iteration, Whenever this expression is negative, the assigned power will be zero.
Having obtained the iterative expression, we then prove its convergence. Reference [10] shows that, if we want to certify that the algorithm ( 1)= ( ( )) p n f n  p converges to a unique point, the function should satisfy the following properties:
These properties can be easily verified for () f p .It is shown in [10] that the fixed point () f p is unique for a standard function. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium is unique.
From (17), the function is defined as
It is easily observed that all terms in (19) are positive, so the function is positive.
Then, we prove the monotonicity of the algorithm. We
where and
We prove its monotonicity of the algorithm.
At last, we discuss the scalability. Because
are positive. Due to 1 point. Therefore, we have proven the existence and uniqueness of NE for PUs' revenues.
V. OPTIMAL CHANNEL ALLOCATION SCHEME
In this section, we propose a low-complexity and efficient heuristic method for channel allocation. We denote * , in r as the optimal available rate of the * th n channel employed by the th i SU. Then, for all SUs, the channel allocation scheme tries to satisfy following condition The SM is similar to the water-filling process [11] , the ellipsoid method converges within 2 () Oq iterations. Therefore, by introducing   optimality, the complexity of our method is 21 2 ( ( 2) 
. However, if we solve the RSG by applying an exhaustive search method [11] , the complexity is 1 2 ( ( 1) 
, which is inapplicable in the large scale practical networks. In addition, the complexity of our programming method is 21 2
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, several numerical examples are presented to evaluate the performances of the proposed algorithm by comparing the following two schemes: 1) Gao's power algorithm [4] by Stackelberg game with random channel allocation where channels are randomly allocated to SUs.
2) Xiao's Stackelberg game model [8] for maximizing the payoff of both SUs and PUs by jointly optimizing transmit power and sub-band allocations of SUs.
We the cell radius of 1000m with the PBS centered at the origin a CRN. The simulation parameters are as follows: Fig. 2 , it is observed that the proposed scheme and Xiao's scheme achieve more number admitted of SUs than Gao's schemes when INR is less than 5 dB. This is due to the fact that for large values of INR, the two algorithms can dynamically and optimally allocate channels to increase the admitted probability through the channel assignment scheme, and the PUs will admit more SUs to maximize its revenue as the INR increases. Thus, it prevents the outage events well in the network.
From the Fig. 3 , we can see the sum rate of SUs obtained by the proposed algorithm and Xiao's algorithm can be better than Gao's algorithm when the INR is more than 0 dB. This is because the two schemes consider the optimal channel assignment to maximize their transmission rate and ensure SUs' QoS requirement. Moreover, our propose play better than Xiao's scheme, because our channel assignment scheme considers and ensures different QoS requirements of SUs. It has the same trend as Fig. 3 shows, the total throughout improvement based on outage events avoidance. Xiao's Scheme [8] Xiao's Scheme [8] SUs' SINR threshold 5 shows SUs' SINR when the INR is 0dB. For all the algorithms, all the SUs' SINR converge to the steady state. With guaranteeing the QoS of SUs, from the two others schemes, we can see that some SUs try to increase their SINR selfishly after reaching the SINR threshold by plays more interference to others SUs and decrease their SINR, which is unfair among SUs. Moreover, the SU who is farthest from the SBS can't achieve its minimum QoS requirement in Gao's scheme. Our proposed algorithm plays better the two schemes, because we set the SUs utility function and channel allocation algorithm to control SUs behaviors and ensure different minimum QoS requirement among SUs.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a novel price-based joint power control and channel assignment with fairness and QoS assurance in CRNs by means of Stackelberg game. Moreover, a novel channel allocation algorithm is given to guarantee SUs' different QoS requirements and ensure fairness. Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm improves the performance compared with other game algorithms.
